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MR • PRESIDENT :
The profoundest issue touching on free government in the United
States / is as old as the Founding Fathers and the Constitutional
Convention of 1787/ and as new as tomorrow 9 s decisions of the Supreme
Court.
The issue is the maintenance of our constitutional equilibrium,
the preservation of that system of checks and balances which has up
to now been the principal guarantee of our heritage of freedom.
This system -- and consequently our freedom -- is now imperiled
by two factors:
The first / is the growing centralization of power in the Federal
government at the expense of the rights and integrity of the forty
eight States -- the Federal usurpation of States' Rights.
The second factor/ is the usurpation by one of the three coordinate
branches of the Federal government/or powers rightfully belonging to
the other branches -- the mounting violation of the principle of
Separation of Powers.
If these trends are permitted to continue unchecked, the ultimate
losers will be the people of this country.
The gainers profiting from this development, as centralization
,'-v;fle.

A-

and encroachment win the ascendancy,A.._p,e those in Russia and elsewhere
who are looking confidently/for the transformation of America into one
form or another of the total state. I might remi~ ~only last
l_
~
June / Mr.Khrushchev hopefully predicted a United States~ in another
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generation or two/ would be~ win sister to the Soviet Union.

He said~

"And I prophecy that your grandchildren in America will live under
socialism."
boastse

The Soviet leaders have been reasonably correct in their

Are they this time?

Let me make it clear at the beginning, however, that I am not
trying to sound the alarm against the imminent Communization of
America,

It is just this sort of exaggeration / that has so success

fully beclouded attempts at serious discussion of this issue in the
past.

Let us at the outset/ get rid of the notion that those who hold

my views/ believe that Communism has already hammered its way into the
White House and is now galloping up Pennsylvania Avenue like a cavalry
charge, about to inundate the Congress.
It is not any Moscow-directed conspiracy promoting the Communiza
tion of our government / that I mainly fear.
Nor do I fear that we will ever fall into quite the same sort of
totalitarianism/ that was exemplified by Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy.
Then what is it that I fear?
What I fear / is what is already visible.

What I fear is the

creation, subtly, law by law, decision by decision -- almost
imperceptibly -- of the uniquely American version of the total sta~e1
What I fear/ is this peculiarly American version of total or neartotal Federal power.
The fact that so much of this dangerous growth has been built up,
if not in accordance with a scrupulous regard for the Constitution, at
least in accordance with the forms of law, is what makes the danger
so difficult for many to perceive and to realize.

The fact that such

and-such an act is passed by the Congre.§§_; the fact that the act is
signed by our duly. elected President; the fact that our Supreme Court,
our highest judicial body, declares it constitutional -- these give

the amorphous growth of central power / and the consequent weakening of
St ates' Rights the marking of an American product ~
But let us bear it in mind, Mr. :&esldent, that totalitarianism in a
red, white, and blue package/ is still totalitarian.ism.
Before I set forth my specific proposition, embodied here in my
proposed resolution, let me, at the outset, plead with all sincerity,
that it is my purpose to bring this problem out for discussion and -eventually

decision, on the highest levels of statesmanship.

Let

me, to begin with, plead that we store away in the attic of forgotten
recrimination /the worn and beaten weapons of sectionalism that obscureq
and confused and distorted debate of these issues in the past.
I hope that I can convey something of the gravity of this
question of States' Rights.

I believe that the time has come/ for

serious examination of the internecine struggle among the branches of
the Federal government / to encroach on one another's prerogatives.
All that I seek / is to open wide a reasonable but vigorous and defini
tive path to the discovery of the facts, with a view to having the
Congress then operate on those facts legislatively, as the facts
indicate,

THE STATE-FEDERAL PROBLEM
First, the matter of the relationship of the States to the
Federal government.

Let me interject here, for the benefit of those

who may be recalling that several commissions and bodies have already
been set up to study this problem, that the Commission which I am
proposing here wouldJfas I shall explain in a momen5f proceed upon a
completely different approach from that followed by these other bodies.
President Eisenhower put the problem very well in his address to
the Governors' Conference at Williamsburg last year, and I should like
to quote him briefly:
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~

nour govei~nmental system, so carefully checked, so
delicately ~ala~ ~ed , with power fettered and the people
free , has survived longer than any other attempt to conduct r;ro1-.1p affairs by the authority of the group itself ..
Yet a distinguished American scholar has only recently
counseled us that in the me~surable future, if present
trends continue, the States are sure to degenerate into
powerless satellites of the national government in Washingt~n.
"That this forecast does not suffer from lack of
supporting evidence all of us know full well. The irony of
the whole thing is accentuated as we recall that the national
government was itself not the parent, but the creature,
of the States acting together.
••••

"Four years ago at your Seattle conference" -- I am
still quoting from the PresidentVs address -- "I expressed
the conviction that unless we preserve the traditional
power and responsibilities of State government, with
revenues necessary to exercise that power and discharge
those responsibilities, then we will·not preserve the kind
of America we have known; eventually, we will have, instead,
another form of government and, therefore, quite another
kind of America.
"That conviction I hold just as strongly today,"
In order to make a start toward remedying the situation, the
President called for the creation of a Joint Federal-State Action
Committee, whose purpose was to make a study looking to the transfer
of cer tain limited powers back to the State governments.
This Joint Federal-State Action Committee was not the first body
set up /t o study problems of Federal-State relationship.

In addition

to valuable studies made by the Council of State Governments, by
u~iversity groups, and by private individuals, there was the Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations, also a project of President Eisenhower 9 s
This Commission made a two-year study of our federal system, reporting
~

to the President in 195jM,1 said to have been "the first official
undertaking of its kind since the Constitutional Convention in 1787,"
The Commission, under the chairmanship of Mr. Meyer Kestnbaum,
submitted its report with the hope that the latter would"••• be
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r egar d ed as th e begi nning rather than the end / of a contemporary study
of t h e sub ject of intergovernmental relations, and that it will
stimulate all the levels of government to examine their respective
r esponsibilities in a properly-balanced federal system."
I am very glad that the Commission termed its report only a
begi nning / and that it urged further study of the problem.
I say this because, in my opinion, despite the valuable research
done by this Commission, its conclusion -- which I shall quote briefly
i n a moment -- contains a major fallacy, a fallacy which my resolution
is designed to avoid.
This fallacy is one which also shows up in the report of the
Joint Federal-State Action Committee / as well as in many of the private
reports on this subject.

The fallacy lies in the fact that these

various reports are fundamentally in error/ in their basic approach to
the problem.

They approach the question of Federal-State jurisdiction /

pr i marily from the standpoint of policy, rather than from a constitu
tional standpoint.
This is the great distinction between that which I am proposing /
Rnd those studies which have been made up to now.

My resolution, it

wi ll b e not8d, emphasizes that the study shall be made / or ''the
respective powers of the Federal government and the State government
under the Constitution"/ and of "the respective powers of the three
branches of the Federal government under the Constitution."

The

reports resulting from these previous studies, on the other hand,
have, as I have said, based their recommendations largely on
considerations of policy -- principally administrative efficiency
and economy.
Let me illustrate what I mean/ by quoting a few short passages
from these reports.
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The Commission on Intergovernmental Relations / insisted that these
Federal-State problems are today political rather than constitutional
in that~

"The limits of the qeles ated and j.m lied national powers /

fix the maximum range of national action.

The existence of such

constitutional bounds/ is probably more important than their exact
location /for the purpose of maintaining the federal nature of our
governmental system •••
"Under current judicial doctrine, there are still limits on the
coercive powers at both levels, but the national powers are broad and
the possibilities by means of spending are still broader •••
level ought to move?
v

Or should both?

Or neither?

Which

What are prudent

and proper divisions of labor and responsibility between them?

These

are questions mainly for .l egislative judgment, and the criteria are
chiefly political, economic, and adminJ..strative, rather than legal. v,
The Honorable John H. Stambaugh, a staff director of the Joint
Federal-State Action Committee, recently explained the approach of
the Committee as follows:
"The only consideration before the Committee is whether a given
function can logically be assumed completely at the State and local
levei!'and be carried on with even greater ~ffectiven~ss than under
present arrangements.

Local control and local decisions over as many

of these programs as possible ~

esirable and necessarY,.

Many of

these programs can be _enriched by the diversified administration of
State and local governments; can be handled more effectiye_ly and
responsively; and the States should and can/ obtain resources to finance
these programs."
In a similar vein, a member of a House Government Operations ~
4 ubcommittee on intergovernmental relations/ applauded the Committee 9 s
recommendations that certain functions be returned to the States, and
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here agai n policy considerations were stressed:
do, 1t said :::=tepresentative Hoffman.

"It 9 s the thing to

He dec1ared that the States will

get "better results and better construction for less money / if they

-

handle their own programs."
As a final illustration of what I call the policy (as opposed
to the constitutional) approach, I should like to quote a few
s entences from a volume of very interesting essays on the subject,
"The States and the Nation" by Leonard D. White (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana State University Press, 1953}:
"These essays are not a study of constitutional
law. I consider the constitutional issue settled
conclusively against the states. The national
government can now go a long way under the inter
state commerce clause and the general welfare
clause; and by grants-in-aid/it can buy whatever
additional authority Congress believes desirable.
The future of the states rests not on constitutional
protection but on political and administrative
decisions •••• The issues of the future in this area
are consequently political and administrative in
nature."
.W..., Mr. President, this matter of considering the constitutional

issue settled conclusively against the States / and resting the whole
futur e of the States on administrative Eolicy and political decisions /
r ather than on constitutional protection is, in my opinion, a very
dangerous procedure.

I cannot over-emphasize how strongly opposed I

am / to any such approach to this problem.

I should almost pref er that

no commission at all ever be set up / to study Federal-State relations /
rather than that one should carry out its study from l!!!§ approach.1.,,
f

r this policy approach confirms the States, at the outset,

as mere subdivisions / of an~ powerful central government.

This

approach accepts the idea /t hat the States~ constitutionally~ have no
case, that there are no such things as States' Rightsj

For, if

certain powers and functions should be assigned to the States, purely
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on a .Q.Q.:J:i cy basis, is it hot clear then that the National government
could, at its whim, take back these functions and powers from the
States 1 for reasons -- or excuses -- of EOlicy?
We should encourage the transfer back to the States of certain
fun ctions now performed by the Federal government •-- ~ n this point,
most of those who have studied the matter seem to be in agreement;
but the principal reason for doing so should .!2Q1 be the question of
policy -- as Mr. Stambaugh, for example, urged, because it is
"desirable," because the "programs can be enriched,"
more effectively and responsively."

99

can be handled

He is right, of course, in that

it is desirable from a policy standpoint~

These programs .£fill be

handl ed more effectively and more responsively by the States.

But

the real reason why we should assign these functions to the States /
is that in so doing / we would be restoring the balance prescribed by
the Constitution.
Any division of State and Federal powers that exists merely at
the whim or sufferance of the National government/is of no lasting
significance.

True, the administration of these governmental

functions by the States / instead of by the Federal government/might
in most cases, definitely would

work out better, from a policy

standpoint; but as far as affording any real protection to the basic
rights and freedoms of the individual citizen (which is in the long
run the policy consideration which should be paramount over all others)
as far as protecting these rights is concerned, such an approach
is worthless, because the States 9 powers and functions would be
predicated not on constitutional right / but on m.e re considerations
of administrative policy or economy.

In other words, they would be

held only at the sufferance of the National government.
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WHY STATES' RIGHTS?
~

"'lhis brings us to the he~rt of the matter, to the com,elling

reason why we must protect and restore the powers of the separate
States, as we are commanded to do anyway by the Constitution.

This

brings us, indeed, to considerations of policy--~ not short range,
relatively unimportant details of administrative efficiency, but long
range, fundamental policy -- in short, the basic practical human con
sideration which makes it so necessary, so vital, that, in this
question of Federal-State relationship, we adhere to the course which
the Constitution prescribes.
I ~refe:r,Mr •. President, to the matter of individual rights -- civil
liberties.

I refer to those basic human freedoms, individual

liberties, which Western man has for so ..!!.la1ll centuries / bled and
suffered and struggled to secure.

Basically, these are the funda

mental liberties at stake in the question of States' Rights.

It is

essential that we look at States' Rights in a dispassionate way, that
we see the principle of States' Rights in perspective.

For many years

the issue at stake has been beclouded, because many people tended to
dismiss· States' Rights / as being simply a cloak for Southern separatist
aspirations, or a device to f'acilitate the exploitation of racial
minorities.

This is false and false to the core.

States' Rights is

an enduring and valid principle, which transcends the issue of race /
and which has existed since long before there was a South.
For States' Rights is but the American term /for the principle
of local self-government, a principle with which the peoples of
Ireland and of Finland, of Czechoslovakia and of Poland -- and ef
Hungary -- are tragically familiar, and for which over the centuries
they have fought and ~trj%gled and ~
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·

The :d,ght of ~ocal self-government/ is as 2.1.g. as history itself•
It is a fundamental and inalienable human right.

It existed prior to

the advent of written constitutions, and in Europe and most parts of
the globe/it exists today independently of constitutions.

Even

though, in many quarters, the exercise of the right has been ruthlessl~
supp~essed by Red force, the right itself/ still exists / and some day
will be reasserted by the subject peoples.
In the establishment of our Union, we recognized this right of
self-government, we incorporated it in our written Constitution, and
we gave it its American name of States' Rights.

Through delegation

by the States of certain of their powers, the right of local self
government was voluntarily limited to some extent, it is true -- in
certain specified particulars.

But on the other hand, the basic right

itself was formalized, that is to say, it was formally recognized by
the Constitution; and, lest there should have arisen any possible
shred of doubt about it, the Founding Fathers took pains to reaffirm
the principle in the 10th Amendment~

"The powers not delegated to

the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
It has become the fashion in late years to ignore the 10th
Amendment, to dismiss it (as one Justice did) as a "mere truism."
B~

n~'tpoint more and more clearly

necessity for us -

8¥iP)'

88.Y to the compelling

if we are to remain a free people -

to re-examine

this Amendment / and to re-dedicate ourselves to the principle of
States' Rights -

local self-government- which it guarantees'/ ..£or1
~·~
1'.
:ind;i ilfi dvarl P'@a.t-w, in tne Iong rt.n,J\ ~squarely on States' Rights,
.

upon the concept of local self-government.

Far from being antithetica1

to each other, as certain parties have tried to portray them, the one
principle depends upon the other.
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It is unfortunate that so manr of those who have labored so
zealously/ in behalf of the cause of individual rights and civil
liberties/ ha~e done so, not merely~in neglect but often in actual
derogatiQn, of the rights of the States.

In order to obtain some

temporary and usually illusory advance in the field of individual
rights, (generally where a minority group complication is involved)
these "human rights" advocates/ have sought to curtail and cut down
the powers and rights of the States/ and, in fact, to reduce the States
to meaningless administrative subdivisions.

In

sG

doing, they are

actually doing the worst possible disservice in the long runt~ the
cause of human rights; for, at the expense of the States, they are
helping to build up a vast concentration of power in Washington.
They are creating a centralized governmental apparatus/against
which the States first, and later the individual citizen, will be
completely powerless.

And when that day arrives -

and, Mr. •Presio.ent,

if we do not halt and reverse this trend in our Government, it will
not be long in arriving--- human rights, minority rights, individual
liberties/will be in the most mortal danger they could~ be in.
When all power is concentrated in the central government, without
effective State governments existing as a check, the end is near for
the rights of the individual.

When the principle of States' Rights -

local self-government-- goes down the drain, individual rights will
follow close behind.

In our American system, the surest bulwark of

-

individual liberty~s the principle of States• Rights.
The Founders knew this, and that is why they established this
right of local self-government /as one of the twin pillars of their

.

carefully-devised system of checks and balances.

They deliberately

set up this system of checks and balances, and made States' Rights one
of its two bulwarks, in order to prevent the rise of a centralized and
11 -

tyrannical power-apparatus, before which the individual citizen would
be helpless.

PROBLEM OF THE THREE BRANCHES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The other major device set up by the Founders in their establish
ment of the checks and balances system-- and this is the second
matter with which the Commission here proposed would deal-- was the
principle of Separation of Powers; that is, the independence of the
three branches of the Federal Government.
enough.

States' Rights alone is not

It is necessary that within the Federal C-overnment itself/

there be a strictly-maintained balance among the three branchee, the
legislative, the executive, and the judicial.

This balance can be

maintained/ only by an unceasing and unyielding resistance to any and
all attempts on the part of any one branch / to usurp powers rightfully
belonging to one of the other branches.

In addition to marking the

constitutional line between Federal and State powers, it would be the
proposed Commission's function / to study and locate and set forth the
proper boundaries of these three Federal branches.

And again, of

course, to establish their respective jurisdictions under the
Constitution, and not simply to determine what boundaries might be
most expedient/ from a policy standpoint.
The pressing need of keeping these three branches within their
proper bounds / I shall not elaborate on to any great extent.

I think

that this need is obvious and clear to most, if not all, of those
present,

This body1 in particular~ should be well aware of certain

trends t<,hich in recent years have seriously threatened the balance.
I will not detail the rash of court decisions which have caused
concern in this body, among Northern, Southern, and Western members
alike, as well as among members of the American Bar/ and among private
citizens.

Suffice it to say that a dangerous trend is in motion / and
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that this time, fortunatel y, a large body of responsible opinion ~eems
at least to have perceived the danger.
I believe that there is an increasing awareness / on the part of
Members of both Houses / of the dangers inherent in this growing
imbalance within the structure of the Federal government.

If in this

address I dwell in more detail on the State-Federal problem, it is
only because I feel that Congress is perhaps less aware of the danger
there, or less concerned over it, and not because I attach any ~
importance / to the problem of the balance of the three Federal branches.
Indeed, in view of the steadily shrinking power of the States, it is
more imperative than ever that the principle of Separation of Powers
among the three Federal branches be scrupulously preserved.

FINAL WORD ON THE STATESi RIGHTS PROBLEM
But to return once more to the States 9 Rights half of the
problem.

Some will point out that the States themselves are in large

measure responsible for their present weakened position; that the
State governments themselves are willing parties to the present trend;
that far from making any serious effort to reverse the trend, State
officials continue to seek more and more Federal grants and hand-outs /
which they know full well will result in increasing Federal control;
and these people may take the view/ that since the States apparently
are unwilling to save themselves, why should we, the Congress, initiate
any move to save them?

/r

'wi. th

the first part of that argument
find myself in at
true
least partial agreement. It is quite/that some of the blame for their
iiiaza~

Q£ esent pl~ ht/ rests with the States themselves.

For one thing, the

lure of Federal money has often been~ strong for the States to
resist.

State political leaders, eager to boast of extra services

provided, yet desirous of keeping State and local taxes down, have
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..
been all too willing to turn to the Federal Treasury-- and, in so
doing, to hitch ever more tightly to their States / the reins of Federal
control.
It is also true that, by neglecting certain fields in which large
segments of their populations wanted governmental action taken, the
States made very easy/ the task of those who were seeking to centralize
power in Washington at the expense of the States.

President Eisenhower

put this very well in his Williamsburg speech, if I may quote him
further~
"The tendency of bureaucracy to grow in size and power /
does not bear the whole of the blame for the march of
political power to Washington. Never, under our
Constitutional system, could the national government
have syphoned away State authority without the neglect,
acquiescence, or unthinking cooperation of the States
themselves.
"The Founding Fathers foresaw and attempted to fore
stall such a contingency. They reserved to the people,
and they reserved to the States, all power not specifi
cally bestowed upon the national government.
"But, like nature, people and their governments are
intolerant of vacuums. Every State failure to meet
a pressing public neel d / has created the oppo~tunity,
developed the excuse and fed the temptation 1for the
national government to poach on the States 9 preserves.
Year by year, responding to transient popular derrands,
the Congress has increased Federal functions. So,
slowly at first, but in recent times more and more
rapidly, the pendulum of power has swung from our
-tD
States towards the central government."
~ 4 . , , , ~ ~ ~ d;.. ~ f
£~~
Like the President, I agree th»t the States t h ~,lv~s / deserve
~

h of the blame; I agree that the States seem littl e disposed / to

take any effective action to resist Federal encroachment, by rejecting
further Federal financial aid.
cannot~ r ~

But even if the States apparently

l not / help themselves, it does not follow that this

Congress should stand aside / and watch the dissolution of our federal
form of government.

The very fact that within the States themselves

there are so many factors and currents -- social, economic, and
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especially political -- which tend to invite Federal encroachment,
makes i t dot:.bly necessary/ that steps be taken ™ / to pres2rYe ',.;ho
rs

-

balance intended by the Constitution.

We are not interested in

preserving States' Rights / just because we wish to do a favor to
State governments as such.

Nor are we interested in the preserving

of a political tradition / merely for its own sake.

The Con

should

be interes~ in preserving States' Rights / because the preservation
of States 9 Rights /is essential to the maintenance of our federal form

.

of government, and is, therefore, vitally necessary to the well-being
of the people of the United States.
CONCLUSION
Mr,Presl.dent, I hope that in this qr~ talk / I have been able to

-

convey
matter.

some sense of the urgency which I feel / in regard to this

I hope that I have been able to make it clear/ why a survey

of the boundaries of State and Federal jurisdiction is needed.

I hope

that I have been able to point out with sufficient clarity / what I think
is the basic fallacy involved / in the previo~%1-y-undertaken studies of
Federal-State relationship--- namely, the emphasis on considerations
~

~

rather than on constitutionalism.

I hope, therefore, tha.t

will agree/that this proposed Commission on Federal and State

Jurisdictionh. s a vital necessity to the preservation of our federal

..

form of government~ nd of our free institutions.
~

I hope th~ ~ : t I '1

support i~esolution.
Much has been said on the floor during the past few days /about
the dangers facing us from abroad.

Let us face firmly and resolutely

this foreign threat; but at the same time / let us look to the
preservation of our freedom at home.
In taking every step necessary to maintain, or to restore, our
system of checks and balances, let us all bear in mind these words of

- 15 -

our first Pr es id ent, George Washington, spoken in his Farewell
Addr ess~
"The necessity of reciprccal checks in the exercise
of poli t ical power, by dividing and distributing it
into different depositories, and constituting each
t he guardian of the public weal against invasions
of the others, has been evinced by experiments ·
ancient and modern; some of them in our country,
and under our own eyes. To preserve them must be
as necessary as to institute them •••• Let · there be
no change by usurpation; for though this, in one
instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the
customary weapon by which free governments are
destroyed."

--.END--
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